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Article 
Control of Communicable Diseases as a Global 
Public Good  
Wolfgang Hein 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, 
Rothenbaumchaussee 32, 20148 Hamburg, Germany;  
Email: hein@giga-hamburg.de; Tel.: +49-40-5206261 
ABSTRACT 
The article aims at giving a comprehensive overview on controlling 
communicable diseases (CCD) and discusses the implications of providing 
CCD as a global public good (GPG). After a short introductory summary of 
the history of CCD, Sections “PUBLIC (COMMON) GOODS” and “GLOBAL 
PUBLIC GOODS” offer a concise definition of the concepts of “public 
goods” and “global public goods”. Sections “INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
REGULATIONS (1969–2005) AS A GPG” and “IHR (2005) AND CCD” 
critically analyse the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) as a 
means to provide CCD as a GPG, and argues that it falls short of that goal 
as (a) many countries are not able to provide the “Core Capacity 
Requirements for Surveillance and Response” because of severe deficits of 
their health systems, (b) the IHR do not include HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, etc. which are a constant threat in infested regions (and to 
international transmission) and may be called “chronic infectious 
diseases” and (c) ignore the issue of fighting antimicrobial resistance. 
Therefore, full global health security (accepting the highest attainable 
standard of health as a human right) needs an integrated CCD which 
implied that CCD is provided as a GPG, including minimal standards of 
health everywhere, a “One-Health” approach, and the perspective of 
“Health in All Policies” (Section “TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CONTROL 
OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AS A GPG”). Section “FINANCE OF CCD” 
discusses the dimension of financing CCD as a GPG and poses the question 
whether an enhanced transnational norm-building and solidarity can be 
expected. Improving CCD is not only one step towards the goal of “one 
healthy world”, but also depends on a comprehensive improvement of 
health services. 
KEYWORDS: global public goods; International Health Regulations; 
delivery of public goods; globalization; health as a human right; health in 
all policies; one health; national public health capabilities 
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WHO World Health Organization 
ISR International Sanitary Regulations 
IHR (2005) International Health Regulations (of 2005) 
GPG Global public good 
NCD Non-communicable disease 
CMH Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
IGO International Governmental Organization 
CSO Civil Society Organization 
GPGH Global public goods for health 
GHD Global health diplomacy 
AMR Antimicrobial resistance 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
GHSI Global Health Security Initiative 
GHSA Global Health Security Agenda 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
GC 14 General Comment No. 14 
PHEIC Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
GISN Global Influenza Surveillance Network 
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
WPV Wild Polio Virus 
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
XDR-TB Extremely drug-resistant Tuberculosis 
MDR-TB Multiple drug-resistant Tuberculosis 
LDC Less developed country 
GFATM Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
CSDH Commission on Social Determinants of Health 
UHC Universal Health Coverage 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
LICs Low-income countries 
DAH Development assistance for health 
INTRODUCTION: SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONTROL OF 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASES  
Measures for the control of communicable diseases (CCD) did not start 
with the International Sanitary Conferences in the 19th Century—as is 
mostly told in the literature on Global Health—but they are as old as the 
recognition of the communicability of certain diseases. Concerning the 
plague epidemics in the late Middle Ages we dispose of an extended body 
of literature on political measures to fight the disease, in particular in the 
city republics in Northern Italy: Health offices and information systems 
(about cases of plague in neighbouring cities and along main trade routes) 
were established, later on cooperation among the cities concerned 
developed [1]. Isolating infected people to specific areas and remote 
hospitals was a common practice. 
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During the 19th century the increasing importance of international 
trade, the growing speed of travel and transport and the growing 
population in harbour cities with a still low level of hygiene (waste 
disposal, drinking water) resulted in a growing international concern 
about sanitary matters [2]. Between 1851 and 1938 fourteen International 
Sanitary Conferences took place to control the international spread of 
epidemics, primarily of Cholera, later on also including plagues and yellow 
fever with a minimal impediment of trade. At the 7th of these conferences 
in 1892 a first binding International Sanitary Convention (ISC) was signed, 
focussing on quarantine in the case of cholera, supplemented by another 
convention in 1897 on plague [3] and in 1912 also yellow fever was 
included [4]. In 1907 the Office International d‘Hygiène Publique was 
established, the first global permanent health organization with the task 
to collect epidemiological intelligence and to implement the ISCs. In 1948 
this mandate was officially transferred to the newly established World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the ISC renamed International Sanitary 
(since 1969 Health) Regulations (ISR/IHR). In 1951 new comprehensive ISR 
were adopted by WHO with the renewed aim of “successful control of 
international transmission of pestilential diseases, as well as removal of 
hindrances to international travel” through “immediate and complete 
information from all parts of the world” [5], while a WHO memorandum 
stressed “A community is more effectively protected…by its own public 
health services than by sheltering behind a barrier of quarantine 
measures” [5]. The ISR referred to six “quarantinable diseases”: plague, 
cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus and relapsing fever [6]. 
Various revisions of the ISR/IHR until 1983 did not strengthen their 
importance in global health. On the contrary, they were reduced to 
coordinating action in the case of only three diseases, smallpox being 
successfully eradicated and typhus and relapsing fever reduced in their 
international impact. This process mirrored the expectations of a 
generally reduced importance of infectious diseases (at least from the 
perspective of high-income countries, HICs) being seen “as the diseases of 
the poor” while the universal rise of non-communicable diseases created 
an increasing concern. Furthermore the idea of eradicating the most 
serious communicable diseases (smallpox, polio, and some others) played 
an important role. The rise of new communicable diseases, in particularly 
HIV/AIDS, and the realization that new infectious diseases transmitted 
from wild animals and adapting to human hosts (such as Ebola, West-Nile-
Virus, Rift-Valley-Fever) will always constitute an important risk to human 
health.  
Taking into consideration the growing mobility—including more 
intense and accelerated contacts with remote regions—as a risk for 
spreading diseases, and the assumed growing threat of bio-terror, new 
negotiations on IHR started in 1995. Assuming that, in principle, trans-
border mobility is a necessary condition for economic welfare and 
personal freedom, and anticipating further that mobility might lead to an 
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unintended spread of infectious agents, the attainment of CCD as a global 
public good (GPG) has to be seen as an important goal of collective action 
in a global interconnected world. The international concern about these 
threats has also been expressed in the expanding discourse of global 
health security (see Section “Health Security”). 
Though the number of publications on CCD as a GPG has remained 
rather modest, in my view this link allows the most complete perspective 
encompassing the elements of CCD, specific goods for CCD and the 
problems related to its provision. I will use the most comprehensive 
publication on global public goods for health by Richard Smith et al. [7] as 
a starting-point (for general issues in particular chapters 1, 13 and 14). A 
short introduction to the problematic of public goods, their provision on 
the global level and with respect to global health will be given in the next 
two sections (“PUBLIC (COMMON) GOODS” and “GLOBAL PUBLIC 
GOODS”). Two sections on the IHR (2005)—negotiated in 2005 and in force 
2007—as a GPG (“INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (1969–
2005) AS A GPG”) and as a policy tool (“IHR (2005) AND CCD”) will follow. 
This will lead to the argument that a comprehensive approach to CCD has 
to transcend the narrow perspective on controlling specific diseases and 
the threat of their transnational spread, but ought to include aspects of 
health systems, universal access to healthcare and the global impact of 
political instability and conflicts related to bad health, as e.g. in the case of 
HIV/AIDS and political instability in Africa [8] (Section “TOWARDS AN 
INTEGRATED CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AS A GPG”), 
which is important for the discussion of financial needs (Section 
“FINANCE OF CCD”). What then, however, is specific to the control for 
communicable compared to that of non-communicable diseases? This is a 
complicated issue, in particular as research has increasingly corroborated 
strong links between communicable diseases (CDs) and non-
communicable diseases (NCDs). One important aspect is the observation 
that while NCDs are rather closely linked to processes of modernization 
and changes in life-style caused by globalization, CDs produce 
unforeseeable threats to development processes, and the persistence of 
many CDs is closely related to the persistence of poverty and low-standard 
health systems in low income societies. 
PUBLIC (COMMON) GOODS 
The idea of a common good which may be “in the highest degree 
advantageous to a great society” but is “of such a nature that the profits 
could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of 
individuals” ([9], p. 559) has been raised by Adam Smith and in a similar 
understanding already by David Hume ([10], p. 383–384). The actually 
prevailing definition of a public good (being neither rival nor excludable 
once the good is provided) builds on contributions by Richard Musgrave 
[11,12] and Paul Samuelson [13] since the end 1930s. Providing public 
goods implies a collective action problem [14]. As access cannot be denied 
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to anyone, public goods will not be provided through market dynamics but 
will only be made available through collective action. This implies 
mechanisms to enforce the provision of the resources necessary to 
guarantee a secure availability of the respective goods. As there will 
always be the risk of free-riders, public goods are mostly provided by the 
state (at different levels of national societies) which disposes of the 
coercive means to make people pay according to rules politically 
determined. This still entails a tendency of public goods to be 
underfinanced due to a competition for a host of public services by 
different political constituencies, and a reluctance to contribute to 
financing state activities. While market failure constitutes the starting-
point of the idea of public goods, there is the risk of government failure 
due to rent-seeking by policy-makers and bureaucrats which will lead to 
advantages for influential groups of the population (and a neglect of 
marginalized sections) or to a lack of public action due to political 
stalemates.  
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that there are “impure 
public goods” that are either non-rivalrous in consumption but excludable 
(“club goods”, such as access to specific hospital services) or non-
excludable but rivalrous in consumption (common pool resources, such as 
many forms of environmental resources, or services of a comprehensive 
national public health system, which depend on limited financial and 
human resources [14–17]. Another qualification refers to so-called access 
goods. These are (in principle) public goods, “that are only non-excludable 
to those who have the requisite private goods to access them.” Examples 
are a computer to access the internet, the necessary infrastructure to 
access clean water or health services” ([18], p. 5f.). 
“Health” as such is a private good because the individual person is the 
primary beneficiary of it; the health of a person depends on his/her 
individual constitution and health-related behaviour. The access to public 
health care can at best be non-excludable, but due to limited resources will 
be rivalrous in consumption (i.e., constitutes a case of common pool 
resources as pointed out by Rocco Palumbo [19]). Improving the overall 
health status of a community, however, is a public good: Woodward and 
Smith point out that there are externalities of the health status of 
individuals in the field of communicable diseases (preventing one person 
from getting the disease reduces the risk of infection of others, reduction 
of disease in one country reduces cross-border transmission, see below, 
Section “GPGs for Global Health: Role of Global Health Governance—
Variety of Actors, Self-Organization, Flexibility”) and with respect to 
the cumulative impact on economic development ([18], p. 10–13). This is 
also implicitly highlighted in the Report of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) which made the point that while on 
the one hand the level of healthcare depends on socioeconomic 
development, on the other hand, health also constitutes an important 
determinant of macroeconomic growth [20]. 
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The early discussion on the provision of public goods was primarily 
linked to the need of public delivery and finance, but public goods can be 
(co-)financed by other actors. This can take various forms: (1) 
contributions from actors willing to pay in spite of the option of free-
riding, i.e., in general co-financing with non-profit/civil society groups 
(philanthropy) [21,22] which voluntarily contribute to their delivery with 
ethical/solidarity-oriented motivations; (2) outsourcing the provision of 
goods to private providers which can be for-profit enterprises, but also 
private partners of health partnerships (PPPs) [23]; (3) cooperation with 
other states with the aim of producing international public goods. All three 
types of sources play an important role in financing global public goods 
(see following section).  
In the earlier discourse it has been assumed that the scope of a public 
good available to a community results from the sum of individual 
contributions (basically in form of taxes if the good is provided by the 
state). The aggregation of contributions, however, varies according to the 
aggregation technologies used which again are linked to the type of public 
good required [22,24,25]. The eradication of diseases e.g. requires on the 
one-hand a so called best-shot technology (allowing the development of 
one most effective vaccine), but on the other hand a weakest-link 
technology (allowing all countries including the poorest) to implement 
successful vaccination campaigns. Taking into account that the provision 
of CCDs is a complex good requiring many different inputs by diverse 
actors (see Sections “GPGs for Global Health: Role of Global Health 
Governance—Variety of Actors, Self-Organization, Flexibility” and 
“Control of Communicable Diseases: A Classical Global Public 
Good?”), the overall aggregation of contributions for CCD cannot be dealt 
with in this article, which focusses on the attempt to give a comprehensive 
overview on the wide range of issues involved in CCD. 
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 
GPG: Definition and Discussion 
Kaul et al. postulate that, besides being non-rivalrous in consumption 
and non-excludable, the benefits of GPGs “are quasi universal in terms of 
countries (covering more than one group of countries), people (accruing 
to several, preferable all, populations groups) and generations (extending 
to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of 
current generations without foreclosing development options for future 
generations)” ([17], p. 2f.). The third aspect draws on the definition of 
sustainable development provided by the Brundtland Commission [26].  
While in general, related to national societies, the state is considered to 
secure the delivery of public goods, based on a legitimate coercive power 
to raise taxes and to secure the implementation of the necessary 
regulations, on the global level there is no world state to fulfil this role. 
International agreements as the IHR could provide a foundation to the 
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delivery of GPGs. There is an extended literature in international relations 
theory on the possibilities and limitations of international agreements and 
organizations which cannot be summarized here. A concise overview of 
IR theories and their view on international cooperation is given by Anne-
Marie Slaughter [27]; a thorough discussion of the growing role of law in 
world politics can be found in a volume edited by Slaughter, Judith 
Goldstein, Miles Kahler and Robert O. Keohane [28]. 
In a historical perspective, GPGs had been provided mostly in limited 
technical fields such as postal and other communication services, the 
protection of the Ozone Layer and the Antarctic Treaty System as limited 
environmental agreements, and, as referred to above, international 
sanitary regulations to control the spread of some particularly severe 
infectious diseases. These are fields where specific common interests 
among nations prevailed because of limited costs to observe agreed rules. 
Concerning international/transnational norms in more complex and 
sovereignty-affecting policy fields, such as international peace-keeping, 
however, implementation will depend on a strong hegemonic dominance 
of one nation or a stable alliance of nations [29–31]. The US hegemony, 
largely supported by the EU and Japan, allowed the establishment of the 
international monetary regime and the WTO trade regime, but this regime 
has been losing effectiveness when hegemony structures became 
embattled through the growing power of emerging economies. This relates 
to health issues in particular in the field of intellectual property rights and 
access to medicines [32,33]. 
Providing GPGs related to reducing economic and social inequality, 
constitutes the most difficult field, as this would imply significant 
structural changes in the working of the world economy (reverting the 
flows of benefits in world trade and investment) and the readiness to 
transfer huge amounts of financial resources. Due to these barriers, 
human rights are a field where binding international norms (international 
human rights compacts and a number of other conventions) are 
implemented to a very limited degree: In the case of civil and political 
rights this is primarily a matter of defending sovereignty, in the case of 
economic, social and cultural rights mainly an aspect of the distribution 
and interaction of economic resources. This also refers to fundamental 
changes in global health and in the control of communicable diseases as 
will be shown in the following sections. 
In recent decades, due to the increasing global interdependence and 
greater role of transnational communities of shared norms and political 
goals [34,35], globalization has brought a growing awareness of conflicts 
and social problems linked to the inequality of global development and 
has established new transnational political spaces that transcend the 
aggregation of interests at the national level. The transnational interaction 
of state and non-state actors produces dynamics and opportunities that 
tend to limit the political options of nation states. While in the so-called 
Westphalian system (referring to the “Peace of Westphalia” (1648), an 
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important landmark in the development of an international system of 
sovereign nation states) nation-states were the main institutions involved 
in formal norm-setting, we now observe a complex structure of new 
modes, spatial levels and institutions that have an impact on global norm-
building. The “old” actors of the Westphalian system remain relevant, but 
their roles are transformed by the challenges to their political monopoly 
through the emergence of new, genuinely transnational actors such as 
IGOs, CSOs, and transnational corporations. 
The greater the density of global social relations, the more important 
are result-oriented policies that improve effectiveness, and the more 
dysfunctional an international system focusing on national power 
becomes. In times of globalization social action is increasingly orienting 
towards people affected by a specific problem in any part of the world. In 
such a process of “global socialization”, national governments might be 
seen as important allies by specific actors, but not necessarily as 
representing the “national interest” of a specific country. In the absence of 
a world state, however, nation states still play a central role in the creation 
of binding legal norms; the implementation of international agreements 
basically depends on their effective integration into national legal systems, 
and even most norms created by non-state networks depend in some way 
on the shadow of state authority.  
The discourse on global health governance (GHG) has stressed the 
growing role of non-state actors in global health, concerning political 
advocacy and direct financial support. Whether global governance 
institutions could be strong enough to install themselves as effective 
elements of an emerging system of public rule in the transnational space 
to provide global public goods in a reliable and impartial way constitutes 
an important question ([33], p. 28; [36]). The following sections will look in 
more detail at this role, in particular in consideration of the stability and 
reliability of this support in contributing to the provision of CCD as a GPG. 
GPGs for Global Health: Role of Global Health Governance—Variety 
of Actors, Self-Organization, Flexibility 
The importance of the GPG concept for understanding processes in 
global health has been thoroughly analyzed by Richard Smith et al. [7], 
which is still the most comprehensive text on GPGs for health. There are 
only a few more recent texts by other authors which use the GPG concept 
within the context of GHG, in particular Scott Barrett ([37]; [25], chapters 
2 and 7), Suerie Moon [38], Joshua Michaud [39], David Gartner [40], David 
Gleicher and Inge Kaul [41], Clint Peinhardt and Todd Sandler ([42], 
chapter 6). 
In order to approach the meaning of CCD as a complex GPG, it is 
necessary to look at the most important components, which Woodward 
and Smith call Global Public Goods for Health (GPGH). They distinguish 
three main areas of GPGH ([18], p. 14f.): (a) knowledge and technologies, 
which in principle are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, but 
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need pre-conditions for their effective use, such as a developed health 
infrastructure and technical expertise, which are frequently not given at 
country level, and are excludable in their practical application 
(pharmaceutical products: patent law); (b) policy and regulatory regimes 
(including or excluding groups by regulations); and (c) health systems 
creating or preventing opportunities to access the respective goods. 
Furthermore the authors contrast horizontal and vertical approaches and 
analyse the respective issues involved in the provision of GPG ([18], p. 15–
17). All these aspects are important for understanding CCD as a GPG (see 
below Section “Control of Communicable Diseases: A Classical Global 
Public Good?”). What is missing, however, is a more thorough discussion 
of the impact of GHG and the dynamics of post-Westphalian global politics 
on the provision of GPGHs. This is reflected in the definition of GPGs 
proposed by the authors: a GPG is “a good which it is rational, from a 
perspective of a group of nations collectively to produce for universal 
consumption, and for which it is irrational to exclude an individual nation 
from its consumption, irrespective of whether that nation contributes to 
its financing” ([18], p. 9). This appears more precise than the definition by 
Kaul et al. [17], but it relates only to “nations” as units and thus is rather a 
definition of international, not of global public goods. 
Providing GPGH, however, has been increasingly based on a large 
number of very different actors (IGOs, states, CSOs, private finance 
(philanthropic organizations), and hybrid organizations (global health 
partnerships)) and therefore requires an effective coordination within the 
global health system, in particular among state and non-state actors 
[43,44]. This is basically a matter of global health diplomacy (GHD) as 
defined by Kickbusch et al. as  
“…multi-level negotiation processes that shape and manage the global 
policy environment for health…, improving the relations between 
states and strengthening the commitment of a wide range of actors to 
work towards a common endeavour to ensure health as a human right 
and a public good” ([45], p. 4).  
Taking into account that responsibilities and entitlements to social 
human rights are not justiciable in the global space, the principle of 
“Intended Nationally Determined Contributions”, established in the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change, should be considered a path to further 
explore for GHD. This would imply a general international acceptance of 
a comprehensive catalogue of measures for a global control of infectious 
diseases (including cost estimates), possibly based on the authority of a 
WHO-led “Framework Convention on Infectious Diseases” (led by WHO or 
an inclusive global health partnership). In periodic Conferences of the 
Parties, members (nation states as well as large non-state actors) would 
have to declare their contributions to implement these measures. These 
contributions would be voluntary but pushed by the urgency and the 
broadly assumed benefits of an effective disease control, which would 
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reach far beyond the limitations of the IHR. This will be explored further 
in the conclusion. 
Control of Communicable Diseases: A Classical Global Public Good? 
Woodward and Smith point to the continuously devastating impact of 
communicable diseases (in 2000 about 30% of the global burden of disease, 
measured in Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs)) ([18], p. 11). In the 
concluding chapter, these authors present a checklist for the correct 
identification of GPGs for health ([7], p. 247/8). On the one hand, there is a 
list of collective problems addressed (such as: prevention, treatment, 
control of cross-border transmission of CDs, disease vectors, health system 
costs), on the other hand, there are different forms of solutions to various 
problems (governance arrangements, knowledge, interventions, health 
systems). This also concerns the geographical scope of the respective goods 
important for qualifying as global public goods, variations in the reach of 
different infectious diseases (from local to global), and of institutions 
(national, regional, global).  
With respect to acute diseases/epidemic outbreaks, the IHR (2005) (see 
in detail Sections “INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (1969–
2005) AS A GPG” and “IHR (2005) AND CCD”) are certainly conceived as 
a GPG in the field of governance arrangements; programs to combat 
chronic CDs and eradication programs aim at realizing collective goods, 
which are global as far as the respective diseases constitute a global threat. 
Disposing of access goods, in particular access to medical care, might be a 
precondition for benefitting of GPGs. In some cases, however, “the cost-
effective supply of access goods may itself be a public good (…), as the cost 
of providing the access goods to those who do not have them may be no 
greater than the externalities arising from the additional consumption of 
the public good” ([18], p. 6), e.g., in the case of vaccination programs. 
The access issue points to problems of controlling communicable 
diseases which cannot be seen in isolation from many framework 
conditions of global health. At least two aspects are important:  
(a) The global map of CDs is constantly changing due to conditions 
which are transforming locally restricted communicable diseases into 
threats for other world regions (mobility, climate change) and to the 
appearance of new pathogens with an epidemic potential, mostly of 
zoonotic origin [46]. The West Nile Fever, Chikungunya, Dengue Fever and 
the Hanta Virus constitute examples of diseases which have become (or 
have the potential to become) endemic in regions with a temperate climate 
[47,48]. Also some types of Malaria had been endemic in Central Europe 
until quite recently (1940s). Thus, the control of many infectious diseases—
which does not only mean the prevention of infections, but also an 
effective treatment of infected persons—should be seen as a GPG even if 
the current prevalence is regionally limited. 
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(b) The quality of national health systems has important externalities 
with respect to providing the GPG of CCD: on the one hand, improving 
national health in general will have a positive impact on the prevention of 
CDs (healthy immune systems), on the other hand, functioning local health 
systems are a precondition for preventing the spread of disease and could 
make international health interventions unnecessary (see Section 
“Tuberculosis, Malaria and HIV/AIDS Control as in Rich Countries—
How Can This Be Implemented?”). This also relates to the control of 
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) which—besides the impact of the 
irresponsible use of drugs in the livestock sector—is due to the 
inappropriate use of antimicrobial treatments. Under the condition of a 
high international mobility, the issue of the fight against AMR is a crucial 
element of CCD, as it closely links the problem of inadequate health 
systems in many poor countries with the international spread of 
communicable diseases, and—as medical innovation is still concentrated 
in a few countries—furthermore to the problem of access to patent-
protected medicines. 
Until recently, common actions to prevent the international spread of 
communicable diseases have focused on the ISR/IHR, and on the 
successive eradication of diseases. The importance to improve the general 
hygienic conditions and local health systems has been recognized for long 
(see Introduction, [5]), but the growing role of vertical/disease-oriented 
programs had led to a certain dissociation between programs of 
communicable disease control with a (not always explicit) focus on GPGs 
and the support of national health systems as a form of health 
development aid (scientific cooperation, political cooperation to adjust 
national programs, cooperation to support poorer countries).  
Taking into account the importance of certain health system standards 
and the improvements in the treatment of many diseases during recent 
decades, I propose the following definition of CCD as GPG: The collective 
good provided by CCD can be defined as “systematically reducing the 
impact of infectious diseases on health in all world regions”, which should 
be seen as a composite GPG, composed of a number of specific GPGs 
related to global governance arrangements, knowledge, interventions and 
health systems. 
The Eradication of Smallpox—Nurturing a False Hope 
With respect to GPGs, the eradication of specific diseases constitutes a 
quite particular case ([18], p. 11f.). While the costs are time-limited, the 
benefits are permanent, which of course provides a strong incentive to its 
provision.  
The assumption of a limited number of killer diseases which are 
particularly prone to transmission through international travel and 
transport underlay the idea of the international sanitary agreements. 
Progress in research on vaccines let the eradication of life-threatening 
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infectious diseases appear feasible, in particular when the disease is 
worldwide considered a serious threat. This was the situation which 
allowed the successful eradication of smallpox through a broadly 
supported WHO campaign; even temporary ceasefires were negotiated to 
allow vaccinations, e.g., between India and Pakistan during the conflict, 
which led to the foundation of Bangladesh [49], in Afghanistan [50] and in 
a number of other countries [51]. Other CDs are on the list of eradicable 
diseases, i.e., malaria, yaws, guinea-worm (Dracunciliasis).  
So far, smallpox is the only CD affecting humans which has been 
successfully eradicated, the campaigns against polio and the guinea-worm 
are close to successful. The Global Malaria Eradication Program was 
launched in 1955, but suspended in 1969 due to the environmental impact 
of DDT, and the growing resistance against the broadly-used chloroquine. 
In 2007, a consultative process to renew the strategy for malaria 
eradication was initiated [52]. In the case of polio, there are only three 
countries with a significant number of endemic cases (Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Nigeria) which are connected to a lack of trust in the 
vaccination campaign supposedly sparked by information about the CIA 
using fake vaccination campaigns as a cover to gather DNA samples from 
Osama Bin Laden’s relatives [53]. 
In spite of some progress, in recent decades it has become clear that 
eradication campaigns can only lead to limited progress in the control of 
communicable diseases. Various origins of communicable diseases can 
never be eradicated, such as diseases spread from wild animals (HIV/AIDS; 
Ebola). The effectiveness of medicines cannot be secured forever, 
mutations of pathogens create anti-microbial resistance (AMR), but also 
new disease patterns (e.g., in the case of influenza). AMR is a rather new 
issue in the field of CCD. This supports the proposal that CCD as a public 
good should not be narrowly defined as the eradication of communicable 
diseases and controlling the threat of a trans-border spread of outbreaks.  
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (1969–2005) AS A GPG 
Health Security  
In recent years, the international control of communicable diseases has 
been increasingly linked to the issue of health security. WHO defines 
“health security” as activities that “require, both proactive and reactive, to 
minimize vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the 
collective health of populations living across geographical regions and 
international boundaries” [54]. The IHR (2005) are considered an 
important instrument to strengthen health security in the field of CDs 
(“vulnerability to acute public health events”). There are, however, many 
concerns expressed about the securitization of health because of its close 
association to “national security” seen as protection against an external 
threat [55–57]. The history of quarantine seems to confirm this viewpoint, 
as well as the role of the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI): The GHSI 
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is an informal, international partnership among “like-minded countries” 
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and the European Commission) to respond to threats of 
biological, chemical, radio-nuclear terrorism and pandemic influenza 
founded in November 2001 [58]. In 2005, full support to the WHO in the 
implementation of the International Health Regulations was declared [59]. 
In the national context, however, the term “security”, also relates to the 
issue of individual security against violence as well as against social 
deprivation (“social security”). This is broadened by the concept of 
“human security”, developed in the UNDP Human Development Report 
1994 [60]. The concept of human security does not only relate to states as 
guarantors of security in international relations, but also to global social 
norms and transnational activities of non-state actors as important 
determinants of health. Informal transnational norms are often more 
effective in the implementation of international agreements than 
negotiations on precise international rules, e.g., in the case of access to 
treatment of infectious diseases [32]. Though it has been criticized that 
within the concept of human security “anything and everything could be 
considered a risk to security” ([61], p. ii), it is significant that it addresses 
“humanity”—everybody can be the cause of a threat and an object of 
protection. “Human security” positions “security” close to the field of 
social and economic human rights.  
During the 2010s the perspective of global health security broadened, 
in 2014 the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) was launched, with a 
membership of over 50 countries “to actively engage with other committed 
partners around the globe to develop and implement mechanisms to build 
and sustain health security capacity in all countries” [62]. The Sidney 
Conference “Global Health Security 2019” still focused on the threat of 
biological pathogens (including their use as weapons), but discussed links 
to more general dimensions of global health (“one health concept”, 
“universal health coverage”, “health in all policies”) which approximates 
it to issues of human security [63] (see also below Section 
“CONCLUSION”). 
“Health” as a Human Right 
Discussing “health security” in terms of human rights, refers to the 
basic dilemma of providing security against outbreaks. There is the legal 
obligation to protect the right to health of the public, but on the other hand, 
there is a need to respect the individual rights of patients and their family 
members. This reflects another perspective than the idea of “security”, 
which does not deal with potential conflicts of values. 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) includes “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable (emphasis, W.H.) standard of physical and mental health” (art. 
12.1). 
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On 11 May 2000, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ESC rights) adopted the “General Comment No. 14 on the Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health” (GC 14) [64], which has the 
status of an “authoritative interpretation” of the legally binding ICESCR. 
GC 14, links the issue of controlling infectious diseases with the obligations 
of states for the provision of universal health care and access to the 
“underlying determinants of health”, as well as with the acceptance of 
other human rights (GC 14, art. 3): 
“The right to health is closely related to and dependent upon the 
realization of other human rights, as contained in the International 
Bill of Rights, including the rights to food, housing, work, education, 
human dignity, life, non-discrimination, equality, the prohibition 
against torture, privacy, access to information, and the freedoms of 
association, assembly and movement. These and other rights and 
freedoms address integral components of the right to health.” 
GC 14 refers to Article 12.2 (c) of the ICESCR (The right to prevention, 
treatment and control of diseases), which requires individual and joint 
efforts of States “to, inter alia, make available relevant technologies, using 
and proving epidemiological surveillance and data collection on a 
disaggregated basis, the implementation or enhancement of 
immunization programmes and other strategies of infectious disease 
control.” (GC 14, art. 16)—aspects later-on taken-up in the IHR (2005). Even 
in times of severe resource constraints, the vulnerable members of society 
must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted 
programmes (GC 14, art. 18).  
The General Comment stresses the obligation of states to  
“…ensure provision of health care, including immunization 
programmes against the major infectious diseases, and ensure equal 
access for all to the underlying determinants of health, such as 
nutritiously safe food and potable drinking water, basic sanitation 
and adequate housing and living conditions” (ibid., art. 36)  
as well as to provide international cooperation to “comply with their 
commitment to take joint and separate action to achieve the full 
realization of the right to health” (art. 38, referring to provisions of the 
Covenant on ESC Rights (arts. 12, 2.1, 22 and 23). 
IHR as a GPG: Acceptance, Realization of Self-Interests and Solidarity 
ESC rights can be interpreted as demanding the provision of basic 
healthcare and some other aspects of health protection as global public 
goods, though the aspect of implementation (financing in particular) is not 
operationalized. “Securitization” might strengthen the motivation to 
contribute resources for global health and to accept the duties of 
international regimes because of a specific self-interest, but it entails the 
risk of not considering the right of others where the own security does not 
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seem to be affected. The perspectives of the “human right to health” and 
the provision of GPGH are thus complimentary. Assuming that global 
socio-economic inequalities have led to different levels of health services 
in different countries, the globally “highest attainable standard” can only 
be reached through transfers of resources from rich countries for globally 
adjusting health standards linked to a common definition of GPGs. The 
ongoing globalization requires linking the use of state authority to global 
norms as a precondition for implementing international agreements. This 
could reconcile the orientation towards self-interests with a sense of 
solidarity within a nascent human society and the acceptance of a 
common minimum standard of health as a basic human right including 
the mobilization of resources necessary for providing global public goods 
for health [65,66]. 
One of such health standards would be the effective control of 
communicable diseases. Seen from this perspective, IHR would be an 
instrument for improving “health security for all”, and not only the 
security of hitherto non-affected world regions from the spread of diseases 
from infected regions to them. This implies a focus which is not only 
concerned with preventing the spread, but which also accounts for the 
global availability of a minimum standard of health services to detect and 
fight infectious diseases at the source and to reduce the prevalence of 
endogenous persistent diseases. “The new Regulations incorporate 
intertwined concerns of public health, security, international trade, and 
human rights.” ([45], p. 45). The IHR (2005) are ambiguous in this respect, 
building on the old focus of fighting the spread, but including (though only 
reluctantly implementing) elements of improving health systems 
conditions of fighting communicable diseases in general. Considering the 
IHR as a GPGH, the critical aspect is the capacity of the surveillance of 
disease outbreaks also in areas with the least developed health systems, 
i.e., requiring a weakest link aggregation technology ([42], p. 175f.). From 
this viewpoint, Section “IHR (2005) AND CCD” will have a closer look at 
the provisions of the IHR (2005) and the experiences made with their 
implementation. 
IHR (2005) AND CCD 
The IHR (2005) as a Post-Westphalian Type of International 
Regulation 
The IHR (2005) define their purpose similar to the ISR of 1951: “to 
prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to 
the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with 
and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade” (art. 2). Due to its 
concrete provisions, however, the new IHR can be seen as a Post-
Westphalian type of international regulation which is transcending 
national sovereignty in a move towards a regime that recognizes global 
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interdependence and valuable contributions of non-state actors. David 
Fidler strongly emphasized the limitations of national sovereignty by the 
role which is given to WHO in the management of the IHRs and the 
authority to decide on emergency actions and to collect and use 
surveillance information from sources other than national governments 
such as the Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network GOARN and other 
international governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-state actors 
[67,68].  
The new Regulations do not relate only to specific CDs, but to all Public 
Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC) including bio-
terrorist threats. In the case of an emergency situation the WHO Director 
General convenes an Emergency Committee of independent experts (from 
a roster of IHR experts, with “due regard to the principles of equitable 
geographical representation”, art. 48) and, based on their advice decides 
about declaring a PHEIC or not. A PHEIC is defined by Article 1 of the IHR 
as “an extraordinary event which is determined to constitute a public 
health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and 
to potentially require a coordinated international response” [69]. In 
cooperation with other IGOs the Director General recommends concrete 
measures among others on the control of persons and the restriction of 
mobility and trade, which again authorise member states to decide on 
corresponding actions.  
The Director General also establishes a Review Committee, with the 
functions to (a) make technical recommendations to the Director-General 
regarding amendments to these Regulations; and to provide technical 
advice to the Director-General; (b) with respect to standing 
recommendations, and any modifications or termination thereof; (c) on 
any matter referred to it by the Director-General regarding the functioning 
of these Regulation (art. 50). Member States, the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, and other relevant IGOs or NGOs in official relations 
with WHO are invited to designate representatives to attend the 
Committee sessions (art. 51). Standing recommendations of the Review 
Committee shall be submitted to the subsequent Health Assembly for its 
consideration (art. 53). 
Every WHO member state has to establish an IHR Focal Point which has 
the obligations to exchange information on issues relevant to the IHR, to 
inform about disease outbreaks which are potential PHEICs and 
coordinate measure during PHEICs.  
Furthermore the IHR requires every member state to dispose of “Core 
Capacity Requirements for Surveillance and Response”. The Core Capacity 
Requirements provide a link to health systems capacities. Annex 1 of the 
IHR determines the requirements which all State Parties have to meet, 
which include (at “the local community level and/or primary public health 
response level”) “clinical descriptions, laboratory results, sources and type 
of risk, numbers of human cases and deaths, conditions affecting the 
spread of the disease and the health measures employed”. According to 
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Article 44 IHR, WHO should collaborate “in the provision or facilitation of 
technical cooperation and logistical support to States Parties”; and “the 
mobilization of financial resources to support developing countries in 
building, strengthening and maintaining the capacities provided for in 
Annex 1”.  
As could be expected, there have been a number of incidents producing 
conflicts between national reactions and international measures to fight 
health emergencies, such as excessive interference with international 
traffic, the unauthorized use of PHEIC to take excessive measures 
motivated by other interests (such as the killing of pigs raised by the Coptic 
community in Egypt) and the conflict on Virus Sharing. Some developing 
countries expressed the fear that the avian flu (H5N1) virus samples they 
shared with the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) 
would be used to develop high-cost patented vaccines that they would be 
unable to afford, and Indonesia, which has reported the highest number 
of H5N1 infections and deaths since the first outbreak in 2003, decided to 
withhold flu samples from WHO in 2006. Finally, in 2010, members of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) reached agreement in principle on a 
framework that created a unified mechanism for the sharing of pandemic 
influenza viruses in the case of a pandemic, and ensuring that poor 
countries have better access to vaccines [70].  
Experiences with PHEICs: SARS as a Prelude, Swine Flu as a Flop, 
Ebola as the Nadir?  
SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome): While the negotiations on 
IHR (2005) were reaching their final stage, the SARS epidemics starting in 
China put the mechanisms proposed in the negotiating commission to a 
strong test. “It is assumed that the economic losses associated with SARS 
were in the region of perhaps 2 per cent of East Asian regional GDP in the 
second quarter of 2003, but emergency measures were successful, so that 
only about 800 people ultimately died from this disease” ([71], p. xiii). The 
effective control of SARS was seen as a great success of WHO. SARS, 
however, was an “ideal case” in terms of the acceptance of control 
measures: The severity of the symptoms legitimized extensive control 
measures and stimulated immediate efforts by many pertinent research 
institutions. The fact that the most seriously SARS-affected countries had 
rather sophisticated public health systems, while at the same time doing 
everything to prevent a spread into poorer regions, can be seen as a factor 
promoting the success of controlling the disease ([67], p. 183). The control 
of SARS speeded up the completion and the adoption of the new IHR by 
the WHA in 2005, and supported an initially high level of international 
acceptance for them.  
Pandemic influenza H1N1: The first PHEIC declared by the WHO 
Director General with the IHR (2005) in force, was less successful in 
political terms. The swine-flu virus A/H1N1 had been known to cause 
infections in humans before, but until 2008 only few cases without severe 
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symptoms had been reported. When in April 2009 Mexico informed about 
an outbreak of a severe form of swine flu causing an increasing number 
of deaths, there was the general fear of a new severe influenza pandemic 
[72]. As the virus was rapidly spreading to other countries and—at least in 
terms of geographical spread—had reached pandemic proportions, a 
PHEIC was declared. WHO and several member states had been criticized 
for that because of three reasons: (a) The “swine flu” turned out to be a 
rather mild form of flu, (b) there was an overreaction in form of 
quarantines, travel warnings and other measures which were not 
recommended by WHO, and (c) the declaration of a PHEIC rapidly led to a 
stock-piling of anti-viral medicines (such as Tamiflu) by many countries 
and thus resulted in considerable revenues for the respective 
pharmaceutical corporations [73].  
Wild Polio-Virus (WPV): By 2013, the annual number of WPV cases had 
decreased by more than 99% since 1988. In 2013, a total of 416 WPV cases 
were reported globally from eight countries, an 86% increase from the 223 
cases reported from five countries in 2012. This was caused by an increase 
of cases in Pakistan, and by outbreaks in five previously polio-free 
countries resulting from international spread of WPV. In 2014, as of May 
20, a total of 82 WPV cases had been reported worldwide, compared with 
34 cases during the same period in 2013 [74]. On 5 May 2014 the WHO 
Director General declared the international spread of wild poliovirus in 
2014 a PHEIC. Considering the low absolute number of infected persons, 
this is certainly not related to the direct impact of a new polio epidemic, 
but to the risk of a broader spread of wild polio virus for the success of the 
eradication campaign ([75], p. 1). Compared to all other PHEIC, the polio-
case has received very little public attention. 
Ebola: The late international response to the Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa (2013–2016) has been broadly criticized by many authors. This 
criticism refers in particular to a reluctant reaction of WHO and other top 
international health actors, such as the United States Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) [76,77]. A similar criticism was made by the 
WHO Ebola Interim Assessment Panel [78]. Only some months after the 
recognition of the virus and more than 800 deaths in Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and Guinea as well as some cases in Nigeria, on 8 August 2014 a PHEIC was 
declared, but the disease could only be stopped after 11,325 people had 
died [79]; on 29 March 2016, the emergency was declared to have ended. 
In terms of the IHR, the Ebola crisis led the international community to 
recognise the need to supplement and possibly to revise the IHR (see 
below). Since August 2018 there has been a new outbreak of Ebola in the 
eastern part of the DR Congo; with so far 3080 people infected and about 
2100 deaths [80]. Again WHO hesitated to declare a PHEIC (done in 17 July 
2019) as the outbreak was limited to DRC territory. Due to the availability 
of effective vaccines, so far the impact seems to be less severe than West 
Africa. Still, violent conflicts restrict access to the vaccines, and there is no 
perspective for an imminent end of the epidemic.  
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Zika: Zika fever is a mild febrile illness caused by a mosquito-borne 
virus which in early 2016 had spread to more than 50 countries. The WHO 
labeled Zika an international emergency in February 2016 [81], probably 
also in view of the expected high risk of transmission during the Rio 
Olympic Games. Since then, there has been a slow-down of the spread of 
the virus. The Emergency Committee meeting on 18 November 2016 
concluded “that Zika virus and associated consequences remain a 
significant enduring public health challenge requiring intense action but 
no longer represent a PHEIC as defined under the IHR”. This was criticized 
by Lawrence Gostin in the Washington Post: “The decision to ‘call off the 
global emergency’ could prompt governments and donors to ‘pull back 
even more’ from what Gostin described as a ‘lethargic’ international 
response” [82].  
The Ebola crisis led to the most basic critical debate on the IHR so far. 
Reforms were demanded in basically three fields: (1) Strengthening 
national public health systems and core capacities [77]. The Commission 
on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future (an international, 
independent and multi-stakeholder expert commission managed by the 
National Academy of Medicine, Washington, DC, USA) calls national public 
health capabilities as “the first line of defense against infectious-disease 
outbreaks” ([83], p. 1284); (2) improving transparency and coordination in 
particular through an Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee for 
the WHO Health Emergencies Programme [84,85]; and (3) strengthening 
the financial basis of the IHR, among others through a Contingency Fund 
for Emergencies to improve the capacity for immediate action [86]. With 
the 10-year anniversary of the IHR's entry into force on 15 June 2017, a full 
and formal IHR review conference addressed these issues as well as the 
problems of virus sharing and the application of IHR to animal diseases 
(among others) [87]. 
Acute and Chronic Infectious Diseases  
There are significant differences between international reactions to 
acute outbreaks and persistent infectious diseases. The IHR/PHEIC concept 
relates to infectious diseases which like Cholera, Influenza, SARS, Ebola 
and Zika are characterized by a rapid international spread prone to 
become pandemic. However, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and many 
tropical diseases, which may be called “chronical communicable 
diseases”, are not considered as public health emergencies (see above the 
WHO explanation for ending the Zika PHEIC). They are progressing more 
slowly, but then are a constant threat in an infested region as well as of 
international transmission. The IHR, however, have not been designed to 
act on such risks even though many countries imposed travel restrictions 
on people with HIV/AIDS (and thus interfered with international traffic).  
This threat has been considerably enhanced through the emergence of 
drug-resistant strains of pathogens. In the case of the alarming spread of 
extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) in the mid-2000s, a WHO 
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Global Task Force on XDR-TB argued “the IHR Emergency Committee and 
temporary recommendations are really intended for outbreaks of acute 
disease, rather than the ‘acute-on-chronic’ situation of MDR-TB and XDR-
TB” ([88], p. 1).  
There is no comprehensive program focussing on the control of 
communicable diseases in general. The HIV/AIDS pandemics has been 
perceived globally as the most fundamental health crisis after the Second 
World War and played a pivotal role in transforming the institutional 
structure of international health politics since the 1990s [89], but it was not 
an issue for the IHR. CDs which primarily affect LDCs are normally treated 
as an ongoing business, such as Malaria, Tuberculosis and other tropical 
diseases. The TDR, the Special Programme for Research and Training in 
Tropical Diseases, a partnership of WHO, the World Bank, UNDP and 
UNICEF for scientific collaboration that supports efforts to combat 
diseases of poverty, dates back to 1974.  
Attention to these diseases has been growing with the discourse on 
neglected diseases since the end-1990s, now basically with respect to R&D 
on new medicines [90,91]. There is now a considerable number of Global 
Health Partnerships to fight specific diseases. These partnerships mostly 
bring together WHO, other intergovernmental organizations, individual 
states, and non-state actors, and have played a significant role in the 
development of Global Health Governance. Most prominent are the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), Roll Back Malaria, 
and Stop TB. After the heydays of the fight against HIV/AIDS, linked in 
particular to the conflict on access to medicines, these partnerships did not 
reach a similarly high level of public attention as the IHR emergency 
responses. 
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE 
DISEASES AS A GPG 
The attention of CCD on chronic and acute diseases shares one central 
characteristic that is the vertical, i.e., disease centred approach. This is 
based on a (mostly implicit) perspective of the eradication of specific 
diseases as GPGH. During the recent decade, however, the international 
health community “re-discovered” the importance of Primary Health Care 
[92] and the support of health system development [93]. As has been 
mentioned in the previous sections, a comprehensive control of CDs 
depends on the universal availability of basic health services. The success 
of countries with a well-established health system in controlling infectious 
diseases supports this argument. 
Tuberculosis, Malaria and HIV/AIDS Control as in Rich Countries—
How Can This Be Implemented?  
During the 19th century, in most of today’s high-income countries, TB 
was the most deadly disease. Systematic case detection (reliable TB tests, 
notification requirements for physicians, improved hygiene, isolation and 
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a conservative treatment (before effective medicines were developed) led 
to a slow, but continuous reduction of open TB cases. After the discovery 
of antibiotics in the first half of the 1950s, the introduction of systematic, 
observed treatment for at least six months, and the introduction of 
compulsory vaccination (even though available vaccines are not fully 
effective), the number of new TB cases sunk rapidly. Since the 1980s, TB 
was no longer present as a serious health risk in most High Income 
Countries ([94], p. 42f.). In England and Wales, the number of TB 
notifications (respiratory and non-respiratory) fell from a high of 117,139 
in 1913 to 5086 in 1987 [95]. This means that—in spite of a recent increase 
on TB incidence to 8659 cases in 2012 [95]—due to national control policies 
and treatment possibilities in a developed health system, TB can be 
controlled, and about 95% of TB patients can be cured. While in 1918 the 
death-rate was about 120/year per 100,000, in 2016 it was down to around 
0.6 [96]. 
In 2014 there were 1022 imported Malaria cases in Germany, of them 
38.9% of the species Malaria Tertiana [97], which could be transmitted by 
mosquito species endemic in temperate regions of Europe, favoured by 
rising temperatures. However, the high standard of health care will quite 
probably interrupt the reproduction cycle of parasites ([98], p. 31). The 
examples of Tuberculosis and Malaria, in combination with the 
framework conditions to control outbreaks of acute CDs, indicate that the 
threat of infectious diseases can only be effectively controlled—including 
the aspects of international transmission and of treatment—if basic 
healthcare is provided everywhere. Health systems are, if 
comprehensively organized and the respective norms implemented by 
state authority, national public goods, but minimal standards of health 
everywhere are an essential component of CCD as a global good. 
In the case of HIV/AIDS the situation is more complicated. Since the late 
1970s—before the HI-Virus was discovered in 1983—the pandemics had 
already spread from Sub-Saharan Africa to the US and Europe. Due to 
prevention measures, effective testing and the early introduction of anti-
retroviral therapies in the 1990s had allowed slowing down the spread of 
the virus compared to developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa. While 
the number of new infections in all Western European countries in 2015 
was estimated at 12,890, the estimate for South Africa alone was 529,670 
[99]. The international transmission of HIV/AIDS has played an important 
role in the spread of the virus; in spite of travel restrictions imposed, in 
2010, 35% of all new HIV infections occurred among migrants from sub-
Saharan Africa. UNAIDS, however, assumes that the majority of those 
infections were acquired while in Europe due to restricted access to 
treatment for undocumented migrants ([100], p. 103), i.e., due to gaps in 
universal health care in European countries.  
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Health Environment and the Control of Infectious Diseases: 
Prevention and Treatment 
It has been shown that CCD has many dimensions. While the IHR, 
strategies to eradicate diseases, as well as health partnerships are 
dominated by vertical orientations towards fighting and controlling 
specific diseases, an effective CCD depends on a number of elements which 
are essential for improving human health in general. This implies a 
growing attention towards horizontal issues of health care and a healthy 
environment [101]. In recent years the horizontal perspective has again 
been strengthened in global health: An important step in this direction had 
been done by the Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH), 
established by WHO in March 2005 and delivering its report in 2008 [102]. 
The CSDH referred again to the goal of “health for all” (Alma Ata 
declaration 1978) and the promotion of Primary Health Care (PHC) as the 
central means towards good and fair global health ([102], p. 33). Though 
the analysis presented here points to the importance of the horizontal 
perspective for CCD, the CSDH Report and the World Health Report 2008 
[92] seem to keep these topics apart, the CSDH Report referring only at one 
place to infectious diseases ([102], p. 62). Only a few years later, however, 
the perspective has been widened towards “universal health coverage” 
(UHC), to provide universal access to all basic health services [93]. 
Furthermore, the launch of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as 
well as the rising awareness on the links between communicable and non-
communicable diseases have resulted in a more integrative approach, as 
has been stressed by various publications [103,104], including a WHO 
publication on the SDGs.  
“The target on UHC underpins all other targets and provides an 
opportunity to refocus efforts on a more sustainable approach 
through system-wide reform, based on the principles of efficiency and 
health service integration and people-centred care. The SDGs also 
fundamentally call for intersectoral action, acknowledging that the 
attainment of health goals is dependent not only on actions within the 
health sector, but also on economic, social, cultural and 
environmental factors.” ([105], p. 41) 
The interactions with other sectors are also stressed by the concept of 
“Health in All Policies” ([102], chapter 10), [106], ([107], p. 256f.). In a 
number of fields links with CCD are obvious: Hygienic conditions imply 
the access to clean drinking water, but also clean rivers and lakes and a 
certain level of cleanliness in the living environment (waste disposal!) 
which reduce the threat from disease vectors and pathogenic agents. 
Healthy food and nutrition, good housing conditions and condition at the 
work-place contribute to improve the health status of people and to 
strengthen their immune system; education plays an important role for 
disease prevention, and structures of good governance are important for 
improving access to medicines. 
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“Systematically Reducing the Impact of Infectious Diseases on Health 
in All World Regions”: Challenges to the Global Community 
The definition given above (Section “Control of Communicable 
Diseases: A Classical Global Public Good?”) aims at a comprehensive 
strategy to prevent the spread and the impact of diseases in one composite 
GPG. The experience of IHR has shown that the successful control of PHEIC 
demands a certain level of health services universally provided, such as 
laboratories, diagnostic capacities and access to treatment. This also 
pertains to the control of chronic CDs, and the global threat posed not only 
by the trans-border transmission of CDs, but also by political instability 
caused by a high burden of disease. UHC should be “universal” not only 
with respect to healthcare within national societies, but in all national 
societies. This includes access to medicines [38], as also the EU Council 
concluded: 
“This [EU] support shall ensure that the main components of health 
systems—health workforce, access to medicines, infrastructure and 
logistics, financing and management—are effective enough to deliver 
universal coverage of basic quality care, through a holistic and rights 
based approach.” [108] 
Thus, an appropriate conception of the GPG of CCD should take into 
account the need to globally guarantee the basic preconditions of UHC. It 
should be noted that a conceptualization of CCD as a composite GPG points 
much more explicit as the IHR to the need of much larger and better 
trained global health workforce in particular in the World’s poorer 
regions. The 2006 World Health Report (“Working together for health”) 
focusses on this issue and estimates that there is a shortage of about 
4.3 million health workers, but also points out that the knowledge about 
the workforce has to be urgently improved ([109], p. 15). A decade later, 
considering the goals set by the SDGs and the deepened discussion on UHC, 
and following the report of the UN Commission on Health Employment 
and Economic Growth a shortfall of 18 million health workers, primarily 
in low- and lower-middle-income countries, is projected for 2030 ([110], 
p. 8).  
Furthermore, attention should also be paid to the so-called “One Health 
Initiative” that aims at linking human, animal and environmental health 
as a strategy to fight communicable diseases and thus to strengthen the 
GPG of CCD, based on the observation that 70% of emerging and re-
emerging diseases are vector-borne or zoonotic [111].  
Comprehensive CCD should be seen as a composite GPG composed of 
many specific GPGs related to the spread and general control of many 
infectious diseases, to medical knowledge and to health system 
development. Considering this in combination with the significance of CCD 
in the fight against poverty and political instability, and with the 
multiplicity of actors in GHG, constitutes the starting-point for a final 
discussion of the problems of financing CCD.  
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FINANCE OF CCD: A TYPICAL COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM 
One of the basic characteristics of public goods is their tendency to be 
underfinanced (see Section “PUBLIC (COMMON) GOODS”), which is 
exacerbated in the case of GPGs due to the lack of state enforcement. 
Otherwise, limited means to provide access to all will endanger the status 
of CCD as a public good. With respect to vaccination campaigns for the 
eradication of diseases it has been pointed out that they require a weakest-
link technology, the same is true for a full implementation of the IHR 
(2005) as well as for UHC. If socially efficient results are to be reached, 
actors have to put the collective interest of world health ahead of their 
specific individual (national or organizational) interests ([42], p. 154f.). 
Discussing these collective interests in terms of public goods, puts actors 
under pressure to accept binding obligations to take over specific 
contributions necessary for implementing the common good (financing 
investments in their community or supporting poorer communities to take 
the necessary steps). It is frequently difficult to reach such binding 
agreements beyond the institutions of the sovereign nation state, even 
more so in the complex field of GPGs. In this situation, the term (global) 
governance is obviously more flexible even when it is defined closely 
linked to the concept of collective goods, slightly modified from a 
definition Richard Smith proposes: “governance is taken to refer to the 
actions and means adopted by communities (original: societies) to 
promote collective action and deliver collective solutions in the pursuit of 
common goals” ([44], p. 124). Typically, contributions to financing “global 
health” or to reach specific health goals are called “development 
assistance for health” or “grants”, are presented as a basically voluntary 
form to “promote collective action” and are discussed in the framework of 
global health governance. “Binding commitments” at the level of 
intergovernmental organizations are normally highly insufficient to 
finance GPGs.  
Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceição published in 2006 an extensive volume 
on The New Public Finance [112] starting from the issue of financing global 
public goods in an increasingly open world economy (in spite of challenges 
to openness, basic features of 2006 do still prevail) and new policy 
approaches towards preference aggregation at the intergovernmental 
level. Observing that many international agreements remain poorly 
funded, they raise “the question of how ell global public policy and 
expenditure priorities are matched” ([112], p. 57). The volume contains 
contributions on financial tools in fields such as “blending external and 
domestic policies”, public-private cooperation, instruments of enhancing 
the efficiency of international public finance. These aspects cannot be 
reviewed here, therefore I will concentrate on a short overview of finance 
for global health, which points to basic problems of providing CCD as a 
global public good. 
The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), established in 
2007 with support by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the 
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US state of Washington “with the goal of providing an impartial, evidence-
based picture of global health trends to inform the work of policymakers, 
researchers, and funders” [113], provide detailed information on funding 
of global health (see Figure 1 for example) [114,115]. Besides that extended 
data sources are published by WHO [116]. 
 
Figure 1. DAH by health focus area, 1990–2018 [114]. Chart reused under Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/). 
In spite of acknowledging a significant growth of contributions to 
global health between 2000 and 2005, authors criticize a persistent 
insufficiency of funding to meet poor countries’ basic health needs, and, 
in addition, severe problems in the global health architecture concerning 
the quality and effectiveness of existing aid and the efficiency of current 
public spending [117] and a smaller relative role for the UN system and 
the World Bank, which “runs the risks of undermining their crucial role 
as trusted neutral brokers between the scientific and technical 
communities on the one hand, and governments of developing countries 
on the other.” ([118], p. 2122).  
Globally there exists an enormous mismatch between countries’ health 
financing needs and their current health spending. Developing countries 
account for 84 percent of global population and 90 percent of the global 
disease burden, but only 12 percent of global health spending ([119], p. 2). 
There is a certain bias towards a purely disease-oriented form of 
financing. Taking into account the financial needs estimated for specific 
aspects of CCD, such as funds to fight health emergencies (see Section 
“Experiences with PHEICs: SARS as a Prelude, Swine Flu as a Flop, 
Ebola as the Nadir?”), R&D on neglected tropical diseases, estimated at 
$150 billion USD for 2008 to 2015 [120], vaccination of children, estimated 
at $40–60 billion USD for 2011 to 2020 [121,122], access to medicines with 
a proposal for a Global Innovation Fund of $2 billion USD ([123], p. 31) and 
basic health services, there is still a significant lack of funding, in 
Health focus areas of Development Assistance for Health 
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particular with respect to financing minimum standards in poor countries. 
Data on per capita total health expenditure show a picture of extreme 
inequality: While (in 2014) Madagascar spent $13.67 USD, and the average 
for Low Income Countries (LICs) stood at $36.5 USD, Switzerland spent 
$9,673.52 USD, the US $9,402 USD, and the average for High Income 
Countries was $4,538.7 USD [124]. The World Health Report 2010 on Health 
System Financing suggests that to ensure access to critical interventions, 
LICs will have to increase per-capita health spending from $32 USD in 2010 
to $60 USD in 2015, supported by development assistance; the results fell 
far short of this goal. In fact, due to the intersectoral links pointed out 
above, significant additional resources are also needed to comply with the 
goal of “health in all policies”, considering the extreme level of social 
inequalities in many countries [125]. 
If—driven by the objective of a universal realization of human rights 
or simply by the global repercussions of bad health in poor countries 
(communicable diseases, but also political instability)—a minimum 
standard of healthcare is to be achieved as a GPG, this requires a 
significant global reallocation of financial resources. This has proven 
difficult already with respect to limited goals such as financing emergency 
operations as well as the core capacity requirements demanded by the IHR 
(2005). Even though a large part of finance for global health has been 
attributed to controlling communicable diseases, CCD—in the extended 
understanding as discussed in Section “TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED 
CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AS A GPG”—has fallen short 
of necessary means. At the global level, negotiated commitments by 
governments and non-state actors cannot be enforced by coercive means. 
Therefore, a research focus on the preconditions and mechanisms to 
implement such commitments is needed which would include analysing 
the acceptance by a general public of costs not directly linked to a specific 
benefit for the local population. This is related to an emerging global 
society [126] characterized by a certain transnational convergence of 
discourses and elements of transnational norm-building and solidarity 
expressed through public opinion, mass media, civil society, and political 
parties [32,127]. 
CONCLUSION: GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR THE CONTROL OF 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASES—COMPONENTS OF A STRATEGY 
TOWARDS “HEALTH FOR ALL” 
This contribution aims at providing a comprehensive view of policies 
to control communicable diseases through the lens of a GPG approach. The 
demand for GPGH responds to growing needs in a world characterized by 
globalization, but providing them, faces great obstacles due to the 
fragmentation of authority in global politics—in spite of tendencies 
towards growing international cooperation and transnational 
communities.  
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In two ways, globalization has led to refocussing CDs: In the 
“developed” world the illusion that these are becoming exclusively 
“diseases of the poor” had vanished definitely with the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
and in developing countries the persistent burden of CDs had been 
recognized as an element of underdevelopment, impeding growth and 
competitiveness with the “developed” world. These perspectives 
correspond to two approaches towards controlling CDs: the fundamental 
remoulding of the IHRs as a mechanism to control the global spread of 
emerging epidemics and to prevent primarily the emergence of new CDs 
in Northern countries (and therefore frequently seen under the lens of 
“health security”) and the rise of global partnerships to fight “chronic” CDs 
in the South as a form of health development aid. This has been 
accompanied for decades—with varying priorities—by strategies to 
improve overall healthcare in developing countries, from “Primary Health 
Care” via “Health System Strengthening (HSS)” to “Universal Health 
Coverage”. 
The experiences with the IHR (2005), in particular after the Ebola crisis 
and obvious deficits in the field of core capacity requirements in poor 
countries, had been at best mixed. Global Health Security as it is aimed at 
by the IHR cannot be secured without a basic surveillance and early 
response capacity in the poorest countries (weakest-link), but the “positive 
synergies” with HSS and UHC are quite limited [128]. UHC is a human 
rights-based concept with potentially vast societal externalities; to link this 
to the political support for GHS/IHR [129] ignores these much more far-
reaching social obligations.  
The long-term effective control of chronic communicable diseases 
implies a broader field of measures in global and national public health; it 
is an essential component of the goal of “health for all”, including complex 
interactions between NCDs and CDs. Research on the “Interactions among 
contributing causes of death” ([103], p. 3) has shown that the strict 
differentiation between CDs and NCDs cannot be upheld. Supposed NCDs 
(e.g., cervical cancer) are in fact transmitted through viruses, while many 
CDs are triggered by NCDs (weakened immune system), by environmental 
and nutritional factors facilitating infections.  
Providing a comprehensive CCD as a GPG (systematically reducing the 
impact of infectious diseases on health in all world regions) implies the 
recognition of “one health” as part of a “global responsibility” (contrary to 
falling back into nationalism). This would lead to a hierarchical structure 
of GPGs: from global justice via UHC (as “GPGs in construction”) to specific 
forms of international regulation (such as the IHRs) to fight CD 
transmission and to campaigns to eradicate specific diseases. Raising 
sufficient financial means for providing CCD as a GPG will remain a great 
challenge for decades to come; a differentiated discussion of this issue 
surpassed the frame of this contributions. 
The analysis of GPGs for health is basically an analytical endeavour 
linking the large field of health topics to their inter- and transnational 
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connections, concerning the impact of developments on the local, national 
and regional levels on the global society on the one hand, of global 
processes on the local and national spheres and the growing consciousness 
that many health goals require a global approach and can only be reached 
through a joint effort. According to Smith and Woodward, the GPG concept 
“is not appropriate as an organizing principle or a prioritization 
mechanism—while it can tell us how to achieve desired outcomes in 
particular areas, it cannot, by itself, tell us what we should do” ([107], 
p. 279). Recently, the link between various prioritary WHO programmes 
(UHC, controlling “threats from high-impact health emergencies”, i.e., 
strengthening the IHR, ...) and the SDGs produced a new demand for a 
more comprehensive view of interdependencies between policy fields and 
for intensifying cooperation in particular to improve the financial basis 
for these programmes. The concept of (global) public/common goods for 
health has been “rediscovered” as a useful tool to better analyse the 
benefits of and the political environment for UHC and to push for a health 
financing reform: the WHO has recently established a “Financing 
Common Goods for Health technical expert group” [130], which in 
December 2019 published a special issue of the review Health Systems and 
Reform on “Financing Common Goods for Health: Fundamental for 
Health, the Foundation for UHC” [131]. By looking through the lens of a 
global public good at the frequently narrow and fragmented analyses on 
controlling infectious diseases, this article intends to contribute to a more 
comprehensive treatment of this field of global health. For fully exploiting 
this approach a much more detailed analysis of specific public goods for 
infection control is needed. 
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